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ABSTRACT

This ten-year longitudinal case study examined collective bargaining between the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers and the Pittsburgh School Board. Data were collected by reviewing all formal contract proposals for the years 1968-1978. To ascertain the impact of collective bargaining on educational policy, policy issues were separated from economic issues, educational policy proposals were categorized, an "institutionalization rate" of the number of policy proposals accepted was established, and an index of the organizational stability of the teachers' organization was devised. Results indicated that the teachers' organization has attempted to use collective bargaining to influence educational policy, but this attempt has met with only a moderate, although improving, rate of success. Factors that seemed to influence the success rate were growing organizational strength and changing school board interpretations of what matters were negotiable. Finally, as to whether a union's stability has an effect on how much the organization is interested in influencing educational policy, results are unclear. If amount of union interest in influencing policy is measured by number of policy proposals submitted, it appears that union stability does not increase interest, but if interest is measured by number of proposals accepted, stability may be perceived as an important influence on it. (Author/JM)

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A Study of a District Teacher Organization's Impact on Educational Policy

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A Study of a District Teacher Organization's

Impact on Educational Policy[1]

This study describes a teacher organization's impact on educational policy within a major metropolitan school district. Specifically, a longitudinal case study (covering a ten-year period) was conducted of the collective bargaining process that occurred between the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers and the Pittsburgh School Board.

The research addressed four fundamental questions:

1. Has the local teacher organization attempted to influence district educational policy through the collective bargaining process?

2. To the extent that the union has been a stimulus for policy reform, has it been successful in institutionalizing its reform goals?

3. What factors influence the institutionalization rate?

4. Does the teacher organization's interest in policy reform change over time, particularly as the union's own position as sole bargaining agent stabilizes within the district?

Two assumptions guided this research. The researchers took the position that the best way to begin to investigate union influence on educational policy would be to undertake a systematic study of the collective bargaining process that occurs between teachers and school boards.[2] This process offers a realistic test of an organization's commitment to an educational policy reform program. It is in the negotiation of contractual

agreements that policy goals compete directly with bread-and-butter membership issues such as salaries and working hours.

A second assumption made in this investigation was that an accurate understanding of an organization's influence on educational policy could only be achieved over time. More data could be obtained using a longitudinal approach. Trends in organizational behavior could be identified as they emerged over time. The review of a number of contracts also assists in avoiding the misinterpretation of unique features that may surface during any single collective bargaining process. Further, the longitudinal approach allows for a potentially key variable such as organizational stability (vis-a-vis competing unions) to be taken into account in the analysis.

Background

Before describing the organizational context of our study, some review of the literature in this area is necessary. The impact of teacher militancy generally, and collective bargaining specifically, on the fundamental structures of public school systems is an increasingly debated topic in education. Looking at the controversy through published materials leads one to divide the issues (and literature) into two basic types. A great number of authors (both researchers and practitioners) address the question of what <u>should</u> be the impact of teacher unions on educational policy. A significantly smaller number of writers (predominantly researchers) have addressed the question of what <u>has been</u> the impact of collective bargaining on educational policy.

Writers concerned with "what should be" the influence of collective bargaining on policy have tended to phrase the question in terms of what would be the optimum scope of issues to be negotiated at the bargaining table. As one might expect, practitioner groups concerned with the "should be" issue have tended to divide themselves into polar extremes. For example, a study sponsored by the National School Board Association (1975) on the impact of collective bargaining on curriculum and instruction found among a survey population of 139 school board members from 26 districts, that there was a very strong inclination to severely limit the scope of what should be negotiated with teachers. In fact, of 18 suggested curriculum and instructional categories, a majority of respondents identified only two areas in which they felt negotiations should take place. (These were working conditions, e.g., non-teaching duties for teachers, teacher evaluation and transfer policies--68%, and teacher meetings, e.g., faculty meeting, principal-building representative meetings--52%.) Conversely, this same study found among 43 teacher organization leaders representing 28 cities, that all 18 curriculum and instruction categories described in the questionnaire "were of importance to negotiations" (p. 7).[3]

The issue of what should be the scope of negotiations has also received wide attention among educational researchers. While the rhetoric here is more reserved, an extreme divergence of positions still exists with three major points of view emerging from the literature.

Some authors (van Geel, 1976; Metzler, 1973; and, Wellington & Winter, 1969) have suggested that the scope should be quite

limited. Their positions are generally based upon legalistic concerns (e.g., boards must and cannot relinguish powers invested in them), political concerns (e.g., teacher power to decide educational policies inherently limits citizen participation), and concerns of a theoretical nature (e.g., the relative vulnerability of public employers--vis-a-vis unions as opposed to private sector employers).

Other educational researchers (Engel, 1972; Corwin, 1966; Summers, 1974; Wollett & Chamin, 1974; and, Weitzman, 1975) have taken quite a different point of view. Namely, they contend that the scope of collective bargaining should be either consciously defined in a way that encourages negotiations on a wide variety of issues, or, they suggest that no limits at all should be placed on collective bargaining. In effect, this latter position follows a "whatever the market will support" view of the negotiation process, with disagreements about scope being worked out on a case-by-case basis. Positions in support of a broader scope in negotiations have been based on issues concerning: the democratization of educational structures (e.g., the constitutional right of teachers to have a say over the general conditions of their employment); the professionalization of teachers (e.g., the capacity to influence policy through the exercise of a recognized expertise is an important requirement if a vocation is to reach professional status); and, simply, the practical realities of contemporary education (e.g., the institutionalization of educational policies without teacher support, particularly in areas of curriculum and instruction, would lead to ineffective changes in any case).

The third major view of what should be the scope of negotiations can be found in the "wait and see attitude" of writers like Michael Murphy and

David Hoover (1974). These authors suggest that teachers are at a critical juncture in their collective development. How they exercise the power of bargaining will largely determine whether a broadly defined scope for negotiations will benefit or harm educational structures. In effect, these authors are saying that the results are not yet in hand.

The literature on what has been (as opposed to what should be) the impact of teacher militancy on educational policy is far less extensive. Cresswell and Murphy (1976) in their work Education and Collective Bargaining note this deficiency in the literature and suggest that until such a foundation for understanding collective bargaining is built, the "practice of bargaining will remain at the level of intuition and folklore" (p. x). The limitation of the literature on what has been the influence of collective bargaining is particularly extreme when one looks for empirical studies, especially of a longitudinal nature.[4] Most empirical work has focused on the economic, rather than the policy outcomes of collective bargaining. (For examples see: "Issues Analysis," September 1978; Lipsky & Drotning, 1973; and, Hall & Carroll, 1973.)

This is not to say that opinions have not been expressed. They have, and, again, the views on the subject vary widely. A recent study (Newby, 1977) conducted by the National School Board Association gives a view of what school board members and school administrators feel about the impact of collective bargaining. This study reports that

> Collective bargaining . . . emerges as the most often cited management concern in the nation's school districts . . . more often than even declining enrollment, cutting programs or staff to balance budgets, discipline, public apathy, or curriculum reform. (p. 1)

The study goes on to suggest "that a large majority of (the 1600) board members and administrators surveyed express distaste for collective bargaining is a major theme of the survey" (p. 1). For example, 88% of those surveyed feel that collective bargaining will force a disproportionate share of school funds into salaries and benefits and that, conversely, collective bargaining will not encourage the allocation of funds to those services which most benefit children (p. 2).

The opinions of scholarly observers about the impact of collective bargaining on educational policies is less clear-cut. Three general positions emerge most often. These positions can be thought of as: (1) teachers have already won control over the policy process; (2) teachers have made some inroads but against heavy opposition; (3) teachers have largely missed the boat (or have been thrown off it) when it comes to using collective bargaining as an instrument for changing educational policy.

Tyll van Geel in his book Authority to Control the School Program supports the first position when he suggests that

> The combined pressures of administrative necessity and union demands already have reallocated power at the local district level so that with regard to the curriculum (for example) the employees of the system are the most influential parties in making curriculum policy. (p. 135)

Van Geel goes on to state that this trend will more than likely continue, and, if it does, it will seriously limit the participation of the community in the policy process.

In contrast, William F. Kay (1973) reviews the scene and finds the results of collective bargaining to be less clear-cut. He states that

> The public school teachers and public employees who are engaged in collective bargaining are still faced with severe restrictions which are contained in the express provisions of the various bargaining statutes; they are still confronted with management rights which are dictated by law; they are still frustrated by the limited fiscal and managerial authority of public employers; and they are still limited by the prohibition against strikes. All of these factors have created measurable roadblocks to achieving a scope of bargaining equivalent to that enjoyed in the private sector. (p. 76)

(It should be noted that Kay does go on to say that teacher organization capability to influence policy might well grow in the future as the general structure of public sector employer/employee negotiations become less ambiguous.)

Finally, a 1973-74 (1974) survey concerning the question of teacher influence on policy matters (based upon a review of New York and California agreements and quoted in Cheng, 1976) reports that

> No significant dimunition of the local school board's control over the formulation of educational policy was observed in this study. The most significant intrusions of teachers in this area were agreements and contracts establishing a system of formal advice and consultation. While one might agree that the board's control of educational policy is diminished when it is compelled to agree to an advisory committee structure, the fact remains that the ultimate power of decision is retained by the school boards in both states. (pp. 55-56)

One might reasonably suggest that at least part of the reason for the wide divergence of views on the impact of collective bargaining on educational policy is due to the fact that there are so few empirical studies available in this area. This may be due to the contemporary nature of

the phenomenon. Effective, militant, teacher organizations have been on the scene for only a short time, perhaps fifteen years at most.

Regardless of why there are few studies in this area, it is a fundamental purpose of this study to contribute empirical information on the question of what has been the impact of collective bargaining on educational policy at the local school district level.

Organizational Context

This study was conducted in a large metropolitan school district. The research data are taken from the ten year period 1968 through 1978. During this period, the city experienced a significant decline in total population from slightly under 600,000 to a current figure of approximately 520,000. The school district similarly experienced a shift in student population of roughly 74,000 down to a current number of 53,000. The teaching force, on the other hand, increased from 3165 to a current figure of 3234. During the same period the racial composition of the system rose from 38% minority to a current figure of 49%.[5]

The first formal collective action in Pittsburgh occurred in May of 1968 when an election was held among teachers to decide which organization, the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers (PFT) or the Pittsburgh Teachers' Education Association (PTEA) would be the sole bargaining agent. The PFT is an affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers. The PTEA is an affiliate of the National Education Association. The PFT won the 1968 election by a slim margin of 183 votes out of a total of 3363 cast.[6] The PFT has retained its position as sole bargaining agent to the present day.

During the ten year period under study the PFT membership grew significantly. Union membership comprised approximately 30% in 1969 of the total teaching force, 50% in 1971, 70% in 1973, and 85% in 1976. The union's membership currently stands at approximately the 1976 level.[7]

Data

The data for this investigation have been derived from two main sources. All formal contract proposals for the years 1968-1978 were collected. In addition, all formally signed contracts (a total of four in 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1976) were reviewed. The contract proposals were obtained from the archival records of the PFT. The contracts were made available through the Pittsburgh Board of Education administrative offices. A total of 728.5 proposals and 218 contract items were reviewed and catalogued.

Design

The basic research strategy of this investigation was that of a longitudinal case study. (See Best, 1977; Isaac & Michael, 1977; Labovitz & Hagedorn, 1976; and, Seltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch, & Look, 1961.) That is, four collective bargaining processes and how these influenced educational policy were documented through a review of contract proposals and contract items.

The use of a longitudinal case study approach was felt to be appropriate for several reasons. First, it was important to document trends in negotiations rather than take a single "snapshot" approach. Any single contract period may have unique features that would not reappear during subsequent collective bargaining processes. Thus, analyses based on

such data would run a greater risk of misinterpreting the events under study. The longitudinal approach was felt to be particularly relevant to the study of collective bargaining in Pittsburgh. This district provided the opportunity to document developments from the initial contract signed by the system with a newly recognized "sole bargaining agent" through contracts signed with the same teacher union as it attained a more stable organizational status.

It is recognized, of course, that the study of a single school district limits the generalizability of results. What one gains in detail, one loses in scope. In recognition of this limitation it should be noted that it is the intent of the researchers to view the Pittsburgh study as a first necessary step on the way towards replicating this type of investigation in a number of additional districts over the course of the next several years. It is hoped that this initial study will provide a useful test for the basic design and methodological strategies used.

Methodology for Analysis

The analysis of data (contract proposals and contract items) required six essential steps.

Establish Focus. It has been noted earlier that the basic goal of the investigation is to document the impact of collective bargaining on educational policy. This has two implications for analysis procedures. Only contract proposals and contract items will be reviewed. Other documents (e.g., public statements by union leaders), and other processes (e.g., interactions between union leadership and board administrative personnel) will not be examined in this study.[8] Further, only proposals and items concerning educational policy will be described.

Distinguish Economic From Policy Issues. The next step required the deletion from our data all proposals and items of a direct economic nature. This was no easy task in that many items overlap with policy matters. However, for this purpose a simple categorization procedure was used to identify those proposals and items which dealt exclusively with rates of compensation, hourly scales, etc.[9] "Exclusively" is the operative word, here. For example, we left in our analysis proposals concerned with lowering class size because these clearly had an educational policy impact as well as an impact on the district's budget. However, we eliminated proposals that designated compensation rates for new teachers to be hired to reduce class size.

Categorize Educational Policy Proposals and Items. There are at least three strategies one can use to categorize educational policy proposals and items. A unique schemata can be developed that closely reflects the actual data one reviews. If one is successful, this allows for a rather straightforward sorting process. A second approach would be to look elsewhere to see how other researchers have approached this problem. The payoff here would be that one's data are organized through procedures that have, to some extent, met the test of the public eye. Using a recognized schemata also permits some comparisons among similar studies, a process that so often cannot take place when one does a case study because of the uniqueness of each case's reporting scheme.

A third approach would seek to utilize some combination of the above strategies. This is, in fact, what was done in this investigation. The ability to demonstrate some consistency in our procedures for categorization was deemed to be quite important. However, no one research

procedure used in another study met all of the specific demands of our data and of our questions for investigation.

A search was undertaken to identify relevant studies that contained procedures for cataloguing contract items (Thompson & Ziemer, 1975; Meyers, 1973; and, Doering, 1972). (No one to our knowledge has systematically looked at proposals.) In addition, various analyses for generally describing educational reforms were also reviewed (Carnoy & Levin, 1976; and, Gross & Gross, 1969).

The best scheme for cataloguing contract items related to educational policy issues was found in the 1975 research report by Thompson and Ziemer sponsored by the National School Board Association (NSBA) on "The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Curriculum-Instruction." With some modification in the categories used in this report, and with the specification of rules to follow when a conflict arose as to where a particular proposal or item should be placed, the scheme developed by Thompson and Ziemer proved to be quite useful. We should note that the particular focus of the NSBA study was on contract items related to curriculum and instruction. However, for the purpose of this research, the domains of curriculum and instruction and educational policy can be thought of as essentially encompassing the same areas.

The authors of the NSBA report state that they developed their scheme in three steps. A search of the literature was conducted which led to the identification of 96 elements related to curriculum and instruction. These 96 elements were submitted to a panel of 80 judges representing teachers, instructional supervisors, and university faculty from departments of curriculum and instruction. The judges rated each of the

96 elements as to their relevancy to the areas of curriculum and instruction. Finally, based upon the ratings, Thompson and Ziemer collapsed the elements into eighteen categories. For our purposes, these categories were further reduced to sixteen with the two categories, time and working conditions as defined by Thompson and Ziemer, being eliminated on the grounds that they only indirectly affected school educational policies.

Insert Table 1 About Here

The sixteen categories used to catalogue contract proposals and items are listed in Table 1. Under each category examples are given of what kinds of demands would be classified in a given domain. For example, the first category in the upper left hand corner subtitled "Additional Personnel," would contain proposals that called for the hiring of additional instructional aides or additional special education teachers. Similarly, the "Classroom," category would contain proposals related to class interruptions and class size.

Categorizing Contract Proposals and Items as Educational Reforms

While Thompson and Ziemer's categories were quite helpful in the basic cataloguing process, they did not readily yield a sense of how the district's collective bargaining process related to the larger urban educational reform processes characteristic of the period under study. To develop this perspective, we turned to Henry Levin's "Taxonomy of Educational Reform" (Carnoy & Levin, 1976). Levin develops four major categories of reform (micro- and macro-technical and micro- and macro-political) to describe possible innovations that may currently be influencing

educational systems as a result of changes in the work places of the larger economy.

Insert Table 2 About Here

Micro-technical reforms "represent those . . . piecemeal charges in schooling within the context of the existing organizational arrangements" (p. 97). Macro-technical reforms are "technical modifications (having) widespread implications . . . (for the) internal organization of schools" (p. 99).

Micro-political reforms "include . . . changes in the internal governance of educational organizations" (p. 103). Macro-political reforms "alter the external governance and control of schooling organization" (p. 104).

Table 2 lists each reform category and provides examples of the kinds of reforms that might be classified in a particular domain. For example, the micro-technical category would include reforms such as the addition of new subjects, and changes in instructional materials.

The reform categories of Levin were used to broadly organize the specific proposal categories developed by Thompson and Ziemer. (While the latter categories were not perfectly divisible by Levin's reform concepts, enough of a fit was obtained to make the process useful.) Table 3 contains the sixteen categories of Thompson and Ziemer reorganized by the four broad reform categories of Levin. For example, proposal areas concerning curriculum, extra-class activities, materials and teacher meetings fall under the micro-technical reform classification of Levin.

Insert Table 3 About Here

By using a multi-layered approach, it was felt that a detailed picture of the proposals and items related to educational policy could be described while building, simultaneously, a sense of how these specific changes were related to larger policy reform issues. The combination of these two schemes was used for the reporting of results in our research.

The sixteen categories, now sorted applying Levin's taxonomy, were used to catalogue all contract proposals and items that were not exclusively economic in nature. Rules for deciding which category to use for proposals and items were developed.

1. Proposals and items were assigned to the category of primary impact based on the judgment of the authors.

2. When a proposal or item clearly had an impact across two (or more categories) it was assigned equally to all appropriate categories with a numerical value of one divided by the number of categories.

A frequency count was used to describe the distribution among categories (Tables 4 and 9). In addition, brief descriptions of selected proposal highlights were reported. This process was replicated for each of the four collective bargaining processes (Tables 5 - 8).

Establishing Institutionalization. Once proposals and items were catalogued, a measure of the institutionalization rate was developed. To measure institutionalization, we simply took the total number of proposals minus the number that were either accepted entirely or in part, to develop

a percent accepted (at least in part) value (Table 4). Examples of proposals that were accepted has been provided (Tables 5 - 8).

Measuring Organizational Stability. The researchers hypothesized that the stability of a teacher organization might well have an impact on the number and kind of proposals a union would make relating to educational policy issues. In addition, it was felt that stability might well influence the "rate of success" in the institutionalization process. As an index of stability, we used the percent of the total teacher population that were union members at the time of each collective bargaining process.[10] Membership variance was quite extreme during this period. The approximate figures were: 30% in 1969, 55% in 1971, 70% in 1973, and 85% in 1976. (Eighty-five percent is also the current level of union membership.) Teacher union leadership did not vary appreciably during these years. The PFT has had the same president and basically the same officers for the entire period.

Results

A frequency count was obtained for all four collective bargaining processes. Five basic kinds of data were documented:

a. the number of proposals by category and by year;

b. the number of proposals that were accepted without significant change as contract items by category and by year;

c. the number of proposals that were accepted, in part, by category and by year;

d. the percent of proposals that received either full or partial acceptance, by category and by year; and,

e. totals for all contracts of the number proposed, number accepted, at least in part, and the percent accepted at least in part.

Insert Table 4 About Here

1969. A total of 163 educational policy proposals were formally submitted to the Board of Education prior to the signing of the 1969 contract (Table 4). These proposals were distributed over 14 of the 16 possible basic categories. At least one proposal was offered in each of the four major reform categories described in Levin's taxonomy. Of the 163 proposals, a total of 6 were accepted without change. A total of 4% of the proposals were either partially, or entirely, accepted.

Insert Table 5 About Here

Some of the highlights of the 1969 proposals are described in Table 5. Three proposals are of particular interest. The union demanded that several model schools be established. These schools were clearly based upon the More Effective Schools (MES) concept then underway in the New York City Public Schools as a result of negotiations with the United Federation of Teachers. The Pittsburgh model schools proposal contained a variety of innovative instructional strategies (e.g., individualization procedures and differential staffing). In addition, the model school proposal suggested that a radically different approach should be used to administer these schools. Responsibility for school policy and instruction was to rest in the hands of a policy board comprised of teacher, community, and administrative representatives.

A second proposal highlight in 1969 was the request that more racially balanced textbooks be purchased. As part of the recognition of the cultural pluralism to be found in the public schools, the union also suggested that sensitivity training be given to teachers located in schools with large minority populations.

A third interesting proposal offered in the 1969 collective bargaining process called for teacher participation in the evaluation of school principals. None of the three proposals mentioned were among the few (4%) accepted. The only union proposals accepted in this initial contract negotiation concerned support for advanced study and teacher scheduling procedures.

1971. A total of 243 educational policy proposals were formally submitted to the Board of Education in 1971 (Table 4). These proposals were distributed over 12 of the 16 possible basic policy categories. At least one proposal was offered in each of the four major reform classifications described in Levin's taxonomy. Of the 243 proposals, a total of 54 were accepted without change, and 12.5 were accepted in part. A total of 27% were accepted either partially or in entirety.

Insert Table 6 About Here

Highlights from the 1971 collective bargaining process are described in Table 6. Three major sets of proposals are of particular importance in terms of scope and emphasis placed upon them by the union. A major proposal in the area of special education was put forward. Specific requests in this area included:

a. the mainstreaming of special students;
b. the annual evaluation of special students; and
c. the initiation of a learning disabilities program.

Another major proposal in 1971 concerned student discipline procedures. Recommendations were made for:

a. better recordkeeping;
b. the setting and enforcement of attendance standards;
c. group counseling for problem students; and
d. the increased use of parent conferences.

A third major proposal called for changes in the curriculum at the primary grade levels to emphasize "tasks to develop auditory, organization, laterality [sic], gross, and fine motor skills."[11] The union's success rate was significantly higher in 1971. Of the three proposals mentioned, the two concerning special education and discipline procedures received at least some measure of acceptance. Twenty-seven percent of all the proposals offered in 1971 appeared in some form in the contract.

1973. A total of 135 educational policy proposals were submitted in 1973 (Table 4). These proposals were distributed over 9 of the 16 possible basic categories. At least one proposal was offered in each of the four major reform classifications described in Levin's taxonomy. Of the 135 proposals, a total of 25.5 were accepted without change. A total of 34% of the proposals were either partially or entirely accepted.

Insert Table 7 About Here

Highlights of the 1973 collective bargaining process are described in Table 7. A major emphasis was placed upon the hiring of additional personnel to expand special education services and to reduce overall class

size. The union also requested the implementation of a Lay Teacher Reading Program. This request was part of a larger emphasis on the improvement of reading skills at all grade levels. For example, another contract proposal this year called for the training of regular classroom teachers by remedial reading specialists. School athletic activities received a great deal of attention in the proposals. Specification of the range of activities and the provision of necessary support facilities were stressed.

Special education continued to receive support. Two requests were of particular interest. The union wanted all references to special education deleted from the permanent student records. Further, they requested that special students be given regular diplomas upon graduation. Of the proposals mentioned, personnel requests, and athletic guidelines, received some acceptance as contract items.

1976. A total of 187 related proposals were submitted in 1976. These proposals were distributed over 13 of the possible 16 basic categories. Again, at least one proposal was offered in each of the four major reform classifications described in Levin's taxonomy. Of the 187 proposals, 80 were accepted without change. Fifty-three percent of the 187 proposals were, either partially or entirely, incorporated as items in the contract.

Insert Table 8 About Here

Highlights of the 1976 proposals are described in Table 8. Several new proposals this year are of particular interest. The union called for the specification of "teacher load" limitations. The creation of a new audio-visual center was requested. Support for team teaching strategies in middle schools was voiced. Perhaps the most interesting new

educational policy proposal to surface in 1976 concerned the union request that the limitations be dropped that heretofore were placed on union action if the school district did not "follow-through" on educational policy items negotiated in the contract. Previous contracts had given such educational policy items a special status that meant non-compliance on the part of the Board could only be challenged through a "meet and discuss" process.

In addition to these new proposals, requests for additional personnel to reduce class size, and the emphasis on reading in elementary schools surfaced again as contract proposals. Of the proposals mentioned, teacher load, personnel and emphasis on reading requests received some recognition as contract items.

Totals. To summarize, a total of 728.5 proposals in policy related areas were submitted during the course of the four collective bargaining processes. Of these, 218 were accepted, at least in part, for an institutionalization rate of 29%. The distribution among the 16 basic categories varied from a high of 14 in 1969 to a low of 9 in 1973. Among the categories, the greatest number of proposals were submitted (in order of highest number) in the areas of:

Professional Improvement
School Organization
Special Programs
Student Related
Classroom

These results are roughly comparable to those of the NSBA Study (1975) that used basically the same categories in a non-longitudinal survey of 28 contracts. Of the 5 areas that "scored" high on our frequency count, only one area, school organization, is identified in the NSBA survey as

not being a frequent item among the 28 contracts reviewed. The remaining four areas identified as most important in our study were cited in the NSBA report as having been found on at least 75% of the contracts reviewed, with the area of professional improvement, having been found on 100% of the contracts (p. 6).

Insert Table 9 About Here

Of the 728.5 proposals, the highest number (273.5) were submitted in the macro-technical reform category of Levin. This was closely followed by the number of proposals offered in the micro-political reform classification (266). This latter category had the highest rate of acceptance (32%).

Discussion

This investigation addressed four fundamental questions.

> Has the union attempted to influence educational policy at the bargaining table?
>
> To the extent that it has been interested, has it been successful?
>
> What factors influence the institutionalization rate?
>
> Does the teacher organization's interest vary over time in relation to the stability of the organization's position as sole bargaining agent?

If we look at just the frequency counts for the PFT, it is clear that this teacher organization has attempted to use collective bargaining to influence educational policy. It is important to note that this concern has been manifested despite the presence in Pennsylvania of a collective bargaining

law that ostensibly limits the scope of negotiations by restricting bargaining to "wages, hours and conditions of employment."[12]

However, our data also demonstrate that proposing policy is not enough. For the hundreds of proposals submitted, the union was able to institutionalize their positions at an overall, and rather modest, rate of 29% during the ten year period under study. Even the 29% figure is somewhat deceptive in that 52.5 of the total 218 proposals were only accepted in part. And, in many instances the difference between what finally became a contract item and the original proposal was quite extreme. This was particularly true of policy proposals that had personnel implications. For example, in 1971, the PFT called for the addition of 170 developmental reading teachers. Five positions were written into the contract. In 1973 the union called for the hiring of 35 additional itinerant speech correction teachers. The contract provided for the addition of 5 of these positions.

In answer to our second question concerning the success of the union's attempt to influence policy, one can say that, the overall institutionalization rate was relatively modest. However, there has been a progressive increase from contract to contract in the number of proposals that have been accepted (from a contract low of 4% in 1969 to the recent high of 53% in the 1976 contract, Table 4).

The third question addressed by this study concerns the identification of factors that influence the institutionalization rate. There are many possible explanations for the increasing success rate experienced by the union. The increased rate was paralleled by the growing strength of the organization as measured by the percentage of the total staff who were

members. It is possible that the growing union membership increased the bargaining power of the union on policy issues.

Alternative hypotheses are also possible. It may be that the union simply became more experienced at proposal writing. One indirect effect of union experience at negotiating contracts does seem to be reflected through the growth in specificity of the proposals over the years. Proposals in more recent contracts tend to be more detailed in nature. There may well have been a tendency on the part of Board negotiators to favor accepting proposals that were clearly specified over earlier ones in the same area that were rather vague in language.

The fact that the language of proposals became more detailed may also have implications for the methodology used in this study. The use of simple frequency counts of contract articles and all accompanying clauses to measure institutionalization rates may unduely favor more recent contracts where proposals had more clauses. Perhaps developing rules for discriminating between articles and clauses with policy content orientations from clauses of an implementation nature should be developed. The point here would be to perhaps give a lower numerical value to those clauses concerned solely with implementation procedures.

Another explanation for the improving success rate of the union may be due to the possibility that, as union leaders grew in experience, they learned to avoid the more controversial issues. Thus, they may have increased their success rate by simply decreasing the controversial nature of their proposals. However, this hypothesis is not well supported by the data. For example, real gains in areas such as class size were made

after proposals were submitted in several of the collective bargaining processes. Also, gains in special education, discipline, and personnel, all came after successive submissions, over a number of contracts, of very similar proposals.

It is our own view that the PFT's growing success rate was a function of two processes. As suggested earlier, we believe that growth in membership did have an important psychological effect on the bargaining process related to policy issues. That is, in the face of growing support among teachers, it became increasingly difficult for management personnel to ignore teacher initiatives in the policy area, particularly since the success of almost any educational policy, regardless of source, rests primarily on the enthusiasm felt for it by teachers.

A second, external factor (to the collective bargaining process), also seems to have been important in the Pittsburgh experience. This concerns the evolving nature of what was considered "reasonable scope" in Pennsylvania. This is not to say that the Pennsylvania law became explicitly more open to a broader scope in negotiations. (In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that the opposite was true, see Cheng, pp. 29-30.) Rather, the expansion in what was negotiable seemed to occur as a result of a growing willingness of boards to discuss policy issues because of their relationship to "work conditions" previously recognized as appropriate for negotiations under existing state law.

Growing union power, coupled with an extension of the Board's perception as to what issues were legitimately related to working conditions, seem to provide the best explanations for the growing success rate to be

found in Pittsburgh. It will be interesting to see whether similar processes have been at work in other districts.

The fourth question addressed by this study concerned the effects of organizational stability on the union's interest in policy reform. The authors hypothesized that as a union's "security" grew, as its local organizational opposition diminished, it would show an increased interest in non-economic (i.e., policy) issues at the bargaining table.

Our feeling was that in a context of high competitiveness (e.g., the first two contract periods) when there was a real possibility that the PFT could lose its position as "sole bargaining agent," economic issues would be given the greatest emphasis. Presumably, this would be done to maximize growth in membership, the assumption being that teachers would respond to self interest (read money issues) first.

The data do not strongly support this position. The number of proposals submitted does not seem to be significantly related to union membership. The largest number of proposals submitted occurred in 1971 when union membership stood close to the 50% mark (see Table 4). Further, the widest range in proposals actually occurred during the first contract negotiations when union membership was hovering at 30% (see Table 4). The problem in our hypothesis may well be with the assumption that teacher self interest, particularly in urban districts during the late sixties, could be solely thought of in economic terms.

Some researchers have suggested that one of the fundamental causes of teacher militancy during the sixties was a drive toward increasing the status of the profession. This drive had two aspects to it. Compensation

rates were important considerations to the establishment of a profession. However, goals such as involvement in decision-making, and the application of expertise to the educational process were also of great importance in stimulating teacher militancy. For example, Hellriegel, French, and Peterson (1970) found that the

> positive, although mild, degree of association between support of teacher strikes and other negotiation factors with high levels of professional role conception (found in their study) indicates a possible related effect with the sources of dissatisfaction. Thus, collective negotiations may be perceived by some respondents as a means of attaining professional goals such as participation in decision-making and some control over task accomplishment. Support for this possibility also has been revealed in the literature which indicates that the drive toward professionalism for occupational groups may involve a degree of militancy as members attempt to change their traditional role relationships. (p. 237)

Ronald Corwin (1966) similarly suggests that teacher militancy is a stage in professionalization. Professionalization as used by Corwin includes "the exclusive license to practice" (in Cresswell, p. 482). That aspect of the drive toward professionalism concerned with the right to decide may have been particularly acute in urban districts. These districts in the previous decade faced growing public criticism. Teachers bore the brunt of these attacks. Anyone familiar with the popular educational literature of that period (Dennison, 1969; Kozol, 1967; Holt, 1967; and Clark, 1965) will recall that teachers were, in effect, declared to be both guilty and impotent.

It seems reasonable to suggest that one likely response by teachers to this chorus of criticism (particularly among the growing numbers of

young teachers entering urban systems) was to try to reform the educational structure. Thus, union self interest might well reflect a policy orientation at this given point in the history of urban schools.

It is not difficult to find support for this view in the Pittsburgh experience. The first contract proposals included such policy demands as racially relevant textbooks, individualized instruction, model schools, and community participation in decision making. One would be hard pressed to characterize such proposals as being of direct benefit to the economic interests of the profession. The literature distributed to teachers flatly stated in 1969 that the union's proposals were "aimed at reforming Pittsburgh Schools" (Performance 1968, p. 1).

To return to our fourth question, it may well be that growth in organization stability is not positively related to a union's interest in influencing educational policy because the underlying assumption of our hypothesis was incorrect, namely, that union self-interest can be thought of in purely economic terms. Therefore, the PFT might stress policy as well as economic proposals during the very years it was in greatest competition for membership.

We should be cautious, however, in presuming that a firm answer to our fourth question can be derived from the data in hand. The term interest is difficult to define. The number of proposals submitted has been the measure of interest used in this study. It is recognized, however, that submission does not necessarily imply strong commitment. Thus, while the number of proposals submitted was greatest in 1971, the question remains, was the union at that time necessarily more interested in bargaining energetically for these policy proposals than, for example, during the

1976 negotiations when the highest percent accepted was attained? We simply cannot answer this question with certainty from the data in hand.

Implications

This investigation has focused on the collective bargaining process in an urban school district during a ten year period. Since this is a single case study, it would be presumptuous to suggest that "findings" are necessarily generalizable to other districts. As previously mentioned it is our intent to expand our data base during the course of the next several years through the study of other districts. However, even though this study represents only a preliminary investigation, it is possible to make several comments about the potential implications of this research, particularly as it relates to existing literature in this area.

In the review of the literature, three central questions are hotly debated concerning the role of collective bargaining in influencing educational policy. One question relates to the issue of whether collective bargaining will permit one interest group in education, the teachers, (some would say, more accurately, union and board negotiators) to dominate the policy process. The data from our study suggest that such dominance has not been the case in Pittsburgh. Although, perhaps like the position of Murphy and Hoover (1974) cited earlier, the results, even for Pittsburgh, are not yet entirely apparent given the growing institutionalization rate of the PFT.

A second question contained in the literature concerns the notion that the contractual negotiations of policy issues may have a tendency to reduce the overall flexibility of the district in several ways. For example,

once a policy proposal becomes a contract item, the school administration is prevented, during the course of the contract, from modifying said policy despite the fact that changing conditions might warrant adjustments. Further, many researchers suggest that once a proposal reaches the status of an item on one contract, there is a tendency to view such items as givens during subsequent negotiations.

Our research tends to confirm both of these positions. Once negotiated, there seemed to be little possibility of changing a policy item during a given contract period. Further, relatively few contract items in the policy area, once negotiated, failed to reappear on subsequent contracts.

A third question found in the literature is related to the concern of whether collective bargaining has the effect of increasing the exclusion of community interests (particularly those of minority and poor parents) from the policy process. Charles Cheng (1976), for example, makes a strong case when he states that, particularly during a time of economic retrenchment, growing union control over the policy process will have the effect of "leaving these (poor and minority parents) 'disenfranchised' community groups even further away from sufficient participation in the policy-making process" (p. 136).

The Pittsburgh experience does not provide a clear answer to this concern. Certainly poor and minority parents did not sit at the bargaining table in Pittsburgh. Yet, proposals for model schools, multi-cultural curricula, and mainstreaming of special students did directly reflect some of the concerns of local parent groups at the time they were proposed. One cannot quarrel with Cheng's position that any organization, including teaching unions, can be expected to vote (and negotiate) on the basis of their own

self interests. However, it is important to note that union "self interests" may at times overlap with those of poor and minority parents.

Ultimately, the concern about parents being excluded from decision-making as a result of the collective bargaining process may be challenged for more philosophical reasons. If one looks closely at the roots of the militancy of both urban teachers and parents' groups, one finds that neither group has exclusive entitlement to the condition of disenfranchisement. In many respects, the teachers and poor parents were knocking on the same doors for their rights. The fundamental commonality of their positions, however, was often lost in fratricidal struggles such as the Ocean-Hill Brownsville debacle.[13]

It seems that a lesson can be learned by teachers and parents from the Brownsville experience. A reduction of teacher rights does not inherently increase the voice of parents in urban school systems. (To take that position one would be forced to argue that poor parents were better represented in the policy process prior to the growth of teacher militancy.) By the same token, the converse is also true. Teachers' rights are not enhanced by the diminution of parent input. Urban school districts need to find a balance where the variety of interests (teachers, parents, management) that are inherently part of the educational process are adequately represented. The collective bargaining process can be a part of a system of balanced participation. A more representative school board that controls the negotiations with a teacher organization can be another component.

Summary

To summarize we have found that in Pittsburgh the local teachers' organization has indeed attempted to use the collective bargaining process

to influence educational policy. However, the attempt to do so has met with only a moderate (but improving) rate of success. Factors that seemed to have influenced the success rate were growing organizational strength and changing Board interpretations about what matters relate to "other working conditions" that were recognized as negotiable under existing Pennsylvania statutes.

Finally, as to whether a union's stability influences the organization's interest in educational policy, stability may not be positively related to union interest based on the number of proposals submitted. However, if one uses the percent accepted, organizational stability, as measured by growing membership, may indeed be perceived as an important influence on union interest. The point must be that given the data in hand, the relationship observed is by no means entirely solid. Too many questions remain as to how one should precisely measure "interest."

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Footnotes

[1]The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of our colleagues William Cooley and Gaea Leinhardt for their reviews of earlier drafts of this paper.

[2]Other approaches are possible. For example, unions also influence policy by taking public positions, by informal interactions between union leadership and school administrators, and through the presence of committee networks, e.g., book selection panels. While recognizing that such interactions can be important to specific policy issues, it was felt that a review of the collective bargaining process would capture a more consistent and much more comprehensive view of the union's influence on policy.

[3]Such dichotomous positions can be found in a variety of published materials. For examples see: Hellriegel et al., (1970) (in Cresswell, 1976, pp. 230 and 357), and Lieberman and Herndon in the February 1979 issue of the Kappan, pp. 415-423.

[4]The most relevant empirical study found to date is by Thompson and Ziemer, 1975. However, this study was not longitudinal in design.

[5]Data for this section obtained from the Office of Statistics, Pittsburgh School System.

[6]Glasser, R. B. "A historical investigation of the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1974. The discrepancy between the total ballots cast and the figure given for the number of teachers earlier is due to the fact that some supervisors and support personnel were permitted to vote in the 1968 election.

[7]These figures were obtained through personal communications with union officials.

[8]It should be noted, however, that such informal interaction between union leadership and school administrative personnel may well be of great importance to the policy formation process. Cheng (1976) reports the importance of such interactions in his discussion of the "acendency of three new classes of professionals in public education . . . board negotiators, union staff, and third party neutrals" (p. 137). However, the type of study required to document such processes relies heavily on field interviews which are quite expensive to undertake. It is possible that resources for such investigations will become available in the near future.

[9]One can argue that all such items have an indirect (at least) impact on policy in that the provision of higher salaries, for example, limits the amount of resources that can be spent on initiatives of a purely policy nature. This notwithstanding, we felt justified in focussing our attention on proposals and items that had a direct impact on educational policy.

[10]This information was obtained from PFT files on per capita contributions of the local to the American Federation of Teachers and through personal communication with PFT officers.

[11]Article four of the "Learning Disabilities Proposal" in Section Three of the 1971 contract proposals. It is interesting to note that the language of this particular proposal suggests a close affinity to an experimental curriculum development project then under way sponsored by the Learning Research and Development Center. (See: Urban Education Reform by W. E. Bickel, Pittsburgh: Learning Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, 1978.) However, there is no evidence of a joint collaboration between researchers and the union on this issue.

[12]Article VII, Sections 701 and 702 of Public Employment Relations Act, Pennsylvania State Legislature.

[13]We are reminded of our experiences in the New York community of Fort Greene in the Summer of 1968. This largely Black and Puerto Rican community had been the scene of interminable disputes among Black and Puerto Rican groups over the distribution of city funds for summer youth programs. What was apparent to many (including Saul Alinsky who had visited this area the previous year) was that "City Hall" had been able to effectively use the animosity between Black and Puerto Rican minority groups to maintain control in their own hands over the decision-making process.

Table 1

Major Curriculum--Instruction Categories*

Proposal or Item Area	Additional Personnel	Classroom	Community Participation	Curriculum	Extra-Class	Faculty Involvement	Materials	Professional Improvement	Racially-Oriented
Examples	aides, special teachers	class interruptions, class size	parent conferences, school-community relationships	content, change procedures, scope, guides, evaluation	athletics, extracurricular	planning, staff planning days, decision making	audio-visual, textbook selection, centers, facilities	in-service, institutes, new teacher training and orientation, leave, advanced study, professional libraries, released time	multi-ethnic programs, integration, composition of faculties

Proposal or Item Area	School Goal	School Organization	Special Program	Student Related	Teacher Meetings	Teacher Professional Responsibility	Teaching Procedure		
Examples	aims of schools	scheduling of classes, school organization, demonstration schools	funds, remedial instruction, programs for handicapped, drop-out programs, early childhood	discipline procedures, grouping of learners, required subjects, citizenship training, student grades	faculty meetings representative meetings	academic freedom, accountability, experimentation in classrooms, rating systems research procedures	demonstration teaching, methodology, team teaching, programmed instruction		

*From: Thompson, A. G., & Ziemer, R. H. "Impact of Collective Bargaining on Curriculum and Instruction," published by the National School Board Association, Report Number 1975-2, p. 4.

Table 2

Taxonomy of Educational Reforms*

Reform Types	Micro-Technical	Micro-Political
Examples	New subjects Changes in instructional materials--different approaches to teaching reading, purging textbooks of sex stereotypes Teacher training and retraining Multicultural and bilingual programs Educational technology (specific application)	Changes in internal governance of classroom or school with respect to students, teachers, and administrators Greater responsibilities to students in operation of instructional process--peer teaching, for example
Reform Types	**Macro-Technical**	**Macro-Political**
Examples	Differentiated staffing Team teaching Open classrooms Flexible modular scheduling Mastery learning Educational technology (generalized use) Work-study Desegregation and integrated education	Community control Educational vouchers Deschooling policies Factory-run schools

*From Martin Carnoy & Henry Levin. The Limits of Educational Reform. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1976, p. 98.

Table 3

Curriculum-Instruction Categories Organized by Reform Taxonomy

Reform Type	Micro Technical	Micro Political
Curriculum-Instruction Category	Curriculum Extra-class Materials Teacher meetings	Additional personnel Faculty involvement Professional improvement Student related Teacher professional responsibility

Reform Type	Macro Technical	Macro Political
Curriculum-Instruction Category	Classroom Racially oriented School organization Special programs Teaching procedures	Community participation School goals

Table 4

Number Proposed/Number Accepted or Accepted in Part

	Personnel (MP)			Classroom (MAT)			Community Participation (MAP)			Curriculum (MT)			Extra Class (MT)			Faculty Involvement (MP)			Materials (MT)			Professional Improvement (MP)		
*	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP
1969	7.5	0	0	13	0	0	6.5	0	0	17	0	0	6.5	0	0	8	0	0	25.5	0	0	26	3	0
1971	15	1	1.5	15.5	0	2	10.5	3	.5	15.5	1	.5	20	10.5	0	4.5	1	0	2	1	0	22	9	1
1973	13.5	0	2	24	4.5	13	0	0	0	7.5	2	.5	9.5	2.5	1	4.5	1	0	10.5	1.5	0	8	0	0
1976	8	2.5	0	18.5	4	1	3	3	0	1.5	0	0	18.5	6.5	5	9.5	1.5	0	19.5	2.5	1	38	19	4

	Racially Oriented (MAT)			School Goals (MAP)			School Organization (MAT)			Special Program (MAT)			Student Related (MP)			Teacher Meetings (MT)			Professional Responsibility (MP)			Teaching Procedures (MAT)		
*	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP	P	A	AP
1969	3	0	0	.5	0	0	19	3	0	10	0	0	12	0	0	3	0	0	5	0	0	1	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	42	10	0	39.5	5	4.5	35.5	0	3	6	3	0	13	10	0	2	0	0
1973	0	0	0	1	0	0	10.5	3.5	1	26	5	2	15	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	.5	0
1976	0	0	0	1	0	0	22	13	2	16.5	4.5	3	11	8.5	1	4	4	0	10	10	0	6	1	2

* P = Number proposed
A = Number accepted
AP = Number accepted in part

MT = Micro Technical
MAT = Macro Technical
MP = Micro Political
MAP = Macro Political

TOTALS

1969 -	163.5 # P	6 # A or AP	4% percent A or AP
1971 -	243 # P	67.0 # A or AP	27% percent A or AP
1973 -	135 # P	46 # A or AP	34% percent A or AP
1976 -	187 # P	99.0 # A or AP	53% percent A or AP
Totals	728.5 # P	218.0 # A or AP	29% percent A or AP

Table 5

1969 Selected Proposal Highlights

Curriculum	Classroom	Community Participation
(NA)* Design of model schools for underachievers.	(NA) Reduce overall class size.	(NA) "Democratic" participation of community in model schools.
(NA) Recommended individualized instruction for educatable mentally retarded.		(NA) "Professionals" will ultimately make school decisions.
(NA) Special grading programs (5 student limit) for those two years behind.		(NA) Employment of parents where possible in schools.
(NA) Library in each school.		
(NA) Psychometrists to administer IQ and Diagnostic achievement tests.		
Racially Oriented	**Faculty Involvement**	**Professional Improvement**
(NA) Pick new, more racially balanced textbooks.	(NA) Teachers help evaluate administrators.	(NA) Program to identify and retain good student teachers.
(NA) Sensitivity training for teachers.	(NA) Model schools to be run by a policy committee of teachers, administrators, and community representatives.	(NA) Award of Summer Fellowships for advanced study.

* NA - Not accepted
A - Accepted
AP - Accepted in part

Table 6

1971 Selected Proposal Highlights

School Organization

(AP)* Specification of number of class periods in a day for secondary and elementary teachers.

(A) Specification of procedures to design school schedules.

Student Related

(AP) Create central job bank for students using community resources.

(AP) Extensive recommendation on discipline, e.g.,

a. record keeping
b. attendance standards
c. additional administrative staff
d. group counseling
e. parent conferences

Special Programs

(A) Mainstream special students.

(NA) Evaluate special students annually.

(NA) Screen all preschool students for speech, vision, hearing, retardation.

(NA) Initiate a Learning Disabilities program.

(NA) Inservice for teachers on epilepsy and cerebral disfunctions.

(A) Locate special classes in mainstream area of school.

Curriculum

(NA) Initiate curriculum changes in K-3 grades to include "tasks to develop auditory organization laterality, gross and fine motor skills."

Classrooms

(NA) Maximums specified for class size.

* NA - Not accepted
A - Accepted
AP - Accepted in part

Table 7

1973 Selected Proposal Highlights

Curriculum

(NA)* Lay Teacher Reading Program.

(NA) English emphasis in secondary schools.

Special Programs

(NA) Opportunity and tutorial schools proposed for students who are disciplinary problems.

(AP) Expand all special education programs.

(NA) Delete "special" citations from student's records.

(NA) Issue regular diplomas to special students.

(NA) Screen 2nd grade students for LD.

Extra Class

(AP) Athletic activities, scope and procedures specified.

Teaching Procedures

(NA) Remedial reading teachers to train regular teachers

Faculty Involvement

(AP) Teachers and parents to assist in formation of discipline codes for schools.

Materials

(NA) Funds requested for supplemental teacher aids.

Personnel

(AP) More special and remedial teachers.

* NA - Not accepted
A - Accepted
AP - Accepted in part

Table 8

1976 Selected Proposal Highlights

Materials

(NA)* Creation of an audio-visual center.

School Organization

(NA) Specification of duties of curriculum and school psychologists, e.g., these positions should not be assigned other duties.

(AD) Specification of number of preparation periods per day (all levels).

Special Programs

(NA) Occupational training for special students.

(A) Continued emphasis on mainstreaming.

Teaching Procedures

(AP) Call for (and specification of) team teaching strategies.

(AP) Emphasis on reading in elementary schools.

Teacher Evaluation

(A) Rating procedures specified.

Faculty Involvement

(NA) Eliminate language in part contracts that limited the actions that could be taken by union if the Board did not follow through on items designated as "education policy" areas.

Classroom

(AP) Teacher load limits specified.

(AP) More teachers to reduce class size.

Community

(A) Release time for participation in community activities.

(A) Required attendance for community/school functions.

* NA - Not accepted
A - Accepted
AP - Accepted in part

Table 9

Total (Number Proposed, Number Accepted, Number Accepted in Part) For All Contracts

Micro Technical

	P	A	AP
Curriculum	41.5	3	1
Extra Class	54.5	19.5	6
Materials	57.5	5	1
Teacher Meetings	13	7	0
Totals	166.5	34.5	8

% A/AP = 26%

Micro Political

	P	A	AP
Personnel	44	3.5	3.5
Faculty Involvement	26.5	3.5	0
Professional Improvement	94	31	5
Professional Responsibilities	28	20	0
Student Related	73.5	13.5	5
Totals	266	71.5	13.5

% A/AP = 32%

Macro Technical

	P	A	AP
Classroom	71	8.5	16
Racially Oriented	3	0	0
School Organization	93.5	29.5	3
Special Programs	92	14.5	9.5
Teaching Procedures	14	1.5	2
Totals	273.5	54.0	30.5

% A/AP = 31%

Macro Political

	P	A	AP
Community Participation	20	6	.5
School Goals	2.5	0	0
Totals	22.5	6	.5

% A/AP = 29%

P = Number proposed
A = Number accepted
AP = Number accepted in part